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Abstract 
The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important 
efficiency and distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are considered. We present 
different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors (lump-sum grandfathering, output-
based allocation [OBA], and auctioning) and among sectors (historical emissions and value-added 
shares). Using a partial equilibrium model, we explore how OBA mitigates price increases, limits 
incentives for conservation in favor of lowering energy intensity, and changes relative output 
prices among sectors. We then use a computable general equilibrium model from the Global 
Trade Analysis Project, modified to incorporate a labor/leisure choice, to compare overall 
mechanism performance. The output subsidies implicit in OBA mitigate tax interactions, which 
can lead to higher welfare than grandfathering. OBA with sectoral distributions based on value 
added generates effective subsidies similar to a broad-based tax reduction, performing nearly like 
auctioning with revenue recycling, which generates the highest welfare. OBA based on historical 
emissions supports the output of more polluting industries, which more effectively counteracts 
carbon leakage but is more costly in welfare terms. Industry production and trade impacts among 
sectors that are less energy intensive are also quite sensitive to allocation rules. 
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Output-Based Allocations of Emissions Permits:  
Efficiency and Distributional Effects 
in a General Equilibrium Setting with Taxes and Trade 
Carolyn Fischer and Alan Fox∗
Introduction 
Increasingly in recent years, many countries have been incorporating economic 
instruments into environmental policy, particularly “cap-and-trade” policies that fix emissions 
limits and allow firms to trade the rights to emit up to that cap. The United States is expanding its 
use of marketable emissions permits from sulfur dioxide (SO2) to nitrogen oxides (NOx) and 
potentially mercury, and proposals to reduce CO2 include emissions trading. The European 
Union is proceeding with the design of an emissions trading system for controlling greenhouse 
gases. Other countries, including Canada, are considering an emissions trading program for 
greenhouse gases. 
When emissions are capped, they become a scarce and valuable resource. An important 
political—and economic—question is how to allocate these pollution rents. Most economists, 
citing the large literature on the “double dividend,” recommend that permits be auctioned so that 
the revenues can be used to lower other distortionary taxes in the economy that otherwise 
increase the cost of environmental regulation. In practice, however, governments prefer to forgo 
the revenues and allocate the permits gratis to the industries covered by the trading system. For 
example, in its acid rain program, the United States distributed all of the SO2 allowances, less a 
small reserve, to existing coal-fired power plants, an annual value in the range of $2 billion. The  
European Union has mandated that member states freely distribute their permits, imposing a 
maximum of 5% for auctioning permits in the first trading period (2005–2007). The McCain–
Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, the main proposal on the table to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions in the United States, provides for sector-based allocations but also some share (to 
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be specified) to go a special nonprofit corporation that would be established to benefit 
consumers, the Climate Change Credit Corporation (CCCC). 
A common method for gratis allocation is “grandfathering,” which gives participating 
firms a fixed number of allowances. In the absence of other market failures, this lump-sum 
allocation offers the same incentives as auctioning permits. However, in giving away all the 
permits, the value of the rents transferred to incumbent firms can vastly outweigh their actual 
cost burden from the regulation.1 Any increase in marginal production costs tends to be passed 
on to consumers, who get no relief from the allocation. Another distributional concern is that 
firms that enter later may not get any allocation and have to purchase all their permits on the 
market. Thus, attention is turning toward allocation methods that can be updated (or will update 
themselves) according to changing market conditions and composition. 
Accordingly, one method frequently advanced is output-based allocation (OBA). For 
example, a cap may be placed on the emissions of several sectors; each sector would be granted a 
fixed number of those permits, and within each sector, individual firms would receive permits 
proportional to their share of their industry’s output. However, since output is a control variable 
of the firm, the allocation policy itself has behavioral effects, which in turn tend to reduce the 
efficiency of the environmental policy. Specifically, the allocation creates a subsidy to output, 
which limits incentives to reduce emissions through conservation and diverts attention toward 
lowering energy intensity. 
Environmental policy, of course, does not operate in a vacuum. The efficiency of a 
standard Pigovian tax or an equivalent emissions permit system relies on the assumption that 
markets are not otherwise distorted. Where distortions exist, environmental policy may 
exacerbate them, rendering simple Pigovian policies suboptimal. We focus on two major 
examples that can justify support for output: imperfect participation and tax interaction. 
Imperfect participation occurs when the environmental program exempts significant 
portions of an industry—for example, small producers, sectors in which monitoring is more 
difficult (like nonpoint sources), or sectors outside the jurisdiction of a regulator (like foreign 
producers of a global pollutant). In greenhouse gas policy, this issue is known as carbon leakage. 
Since they bear no environmental burden, excluded producers suddenly have relatively low costs 
compared with participants. Industry production then tends to shift away from participants 
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toward nonparticipants (who are still emitting costlessly). An output subsidy for participants 
would discourage such intra-industry shifting of production and emissions. Bernard et al. (2001) 
show that when the products of the exempt firms cannot be taxed to reflect the value of the 
embodied emissions, an output subsidy may be warranted—to the extent these products are close 
substitutes for those produced by regulated firms. 
Taxing labor income creates another kind of imperfection by distorting the labor/leisure 
trade-off; in a sense, it taxes all consumption goods at the same rate, making them more 
expensive and making consuming leisure more attractive than consuming goods. Adding an 
environmental policy that makes some consumption goods even more expensive further distorts 
this trade-off. Environmental policies that raise revenues that can be used to lower distorting 
labor taxes unambiguously raise welfare from the no-policy scenario. However, the optimal 
environmental tax (or auctioned permit price) in this second-best setting is still less than the 
Pigovian tax.2 Policies that do not raise revenue (such as grandfathered permits) must have 
positive environmental benefits that outweigh the increased deadweight loss from the labor tax 
on the margin.3
By providing a subsidy to output, output-based rebating may mitigate some of the impact 
of the tax interaction effect compared with lump-sum distribution. The implicit subsidy lowers 
the price of the dirty good, making goods consumption in general less expensive and real wages 
higher. However, the gain from a reduced disincentive must be balanced against the higher 
abatement cost of achieving the same level of emissions reduction. The net result may (or may 
not) be an improvement over distributed permits in this situation. 
Parry et al. (1999) show that performance standards can generate fewer efficiency costs 
than distributed permits in this second-best system. In their model, performance standards are 
less costly the less abatement is to be done by output adjustment than by emissions rate 
adjustment. On the other hand, Jensen and Rasmussen (1998), using a general equilibrium model 
of the Danish economy, find that allocating emissions permits according to output dampens 
sectoral adjustment but imposes greater welfare costs than grandfathered permits. Dissou (2003), 
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3 See Parry (1996), Parry et al. (1999), and Goulder et al. (1997). Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) make the distinction 
that policies that create scarcity rents (as opposed to policies that raise no revenue) are those that interact with labor 
tax distortions. 
3 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Fox 
in an application to greenhouse gas reductions in Canada, finds that performance standards can 
mitigate losses in gross domestic product, but welfare is lower relative to grandfathered permits. 
Although performance standards bear similarities to output-based allocation, there are 
some important differences. Performance standards (particularly tradable ones) allocate permits 
according to output and the target emissions intensity. In theory, they could be set so as to equate 
marginal abatement costs across multiple sectors.4 Such a result can be replicated with a 
multisector cap-and-trade system with OBA, but with a single set of allocations at the sector 
level. In practice, many different sectoral allocation rules are possible—and more plausible—
than expected equilibrium average emissions. Since these sectoral allocations determine the 
relative subsidy for output, we closely examine the effects of different rules for dividing an 
emissions cap among sectors. 
We look at how well OBA can address these issues relative to grandfathering or 
auctioning emissions permits. We begin with some theoretical background, using a partial-
equilibrium analytical model, before proceeding to the general-equilibrium numerical analysis. 
We use a version of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP-EG, modified to 
incorporate a labor/leisure choice, to look at how well OBA can address issues of equity and 
efficiency relative to grandfathering emissions permits or auctioning with revenue recycling and 
with trade effects. 
We find that the rules for setting the initial sectoral caps play an important role in 
determining the changes in welfare, industrial production, employment, and trade induced by the 
emissions policy. OBA with sectoral distributions based on value added generates effective 
subsidies more like a broad-based tax reduction, performing nearly like auctions and clearly 
outperforming lump-sum allocations. OBA based on historical emissions supports the output of 
more polluting industries, which more effectively counteracts carbon leakage but is more costly 
in welfare terms. With less contraction among polluting sectors, more reductions must be sought 
among less carbon-intensive sectors, signaled by a higher carbon permit price. However, because 
of the importance of the tax interaction problem, historical OBA remains less costly in net 
welfare terms than traditional permit grandfathering. In all cases output-based rebating is strictly 
less efficient than auctioned permits, which raise revenues that offset labor taxes and encourage 
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more work, and they achieve this in a manner that does not distort the relative prices of dirty and 
clean goods. 
Partial Equilibrium Model 
To build intuition for the first-order effects of different allocation mechanisms, we first 
present a partial equilibrium model of the affected industry. In the next section, we incorporate 
these industry incentives into a general equilibrium setting, to better account for the incidence of 
allocation on all prices and interactions with the broader tax system. 
Consider a perfectly competitive industry with a representative firm that is a price taker 
in both product and emissions markets. The unit cost function, c, is represented as a decreasing 
convex function of the emissions rate µ . In other words, the firm chooses a technological or 
input mix that implies a given emissions rate and exhibits constant returns to scale, which 
corresponds to a constant per-unit cost. Let y be the output of our representative firm, p the 
market price for the good produced, and t the price of a pollution permit. Consumer inverse 
demand p(y) is downward sloping and, in equilibrium, equal to the market price. 
Lump-Sum Allocation 
With lump-sum allocation, such as grandfathering or auctioned permits, the allocation is 
invariant to firm behavior. When permits are grandfathered, we assume that this allocation is 
unconditional and is unaffected by decisions to enter or exit the market. Consequently, the 
choices of emissions rate and output are unaffected by the allocation, at least in a partial 
equilibrium model. 
Let A be the lump-sum allocation to the firm. Firm profits are 
 (( ))
LS p ct y πµ µ t A = −−+  (1) 
By the first-order conditions, the firm equalizes the marginal cost of emissions rate 
reduction with the price of emissions 
  '( ) ct µ − =  (2) 
and the market price reflects the unit cost of production and the external cost of the embodied 
emissions: 
  () p ct µ µ = +  (3) 
This result corresponds to standard Pigovian pricing. If each sector’s emissions cap were 
initially set to generate socially optimal reductions, in a market with multiple sectors, trade 
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across sectors would reproduce the same efficient emissions and product pricing—excluding 
other market failures and general equilibrium effects. 
Output-Based Allocation 
With output-based allocation, the industry receives an allocation A, which is then 
distributed among the firms in proportion to their output. In equilibrium, the per-unit allocation is 
, which a representative competitive firm takes as given. Although we present this 
representation as a result of an allocation rule with updating in the short run, this implicit subsidy 
can also represent the long run effects of grandfathered permits that are conditional on continued 
operation.
/ aA y =
5 The profit function for a representative firm within an industry is expressed as 
 (( ) () )
OBA p ct a πµ µ =− − −y  (4) 
The firm’s profits are therefore reduced by the cost of the additional permits it must 
purchase (if  a µ > ) or increased by the value of excess permits it can sell off (if  a µ < ). To 
optimize profits, the firm equalizes the marginal cost of emissions rate reduction as in (2). 
However, given any emissions rate, the market price is lower than with lump-sum allocation by 
the value of the per-unit allocation: 
 () ( ) Pc t a µ µ = +−  (5) 
Consequently, output will be higher. In other words, with output-based allocation, the 
Pigovian emissions rate and price will lead to greater than optimal emissions. The dual to this 
problem is that to achieve the same level of emissions as the optimal case, the marginal price of 
emissions must rise and the emissions rate must fall. Thus, for a given amount of emissions 
reduction, output-based rebating raises the marginal cost of emissions reduction relative to 
efficient policy. 
We also note that a lump-sum allocation that is conditional on operating (not exiting the 
market) can offer long-run incentives that are similar to output-based allocation, since the long-
run average cost is lowered by the per-unit value of the allocation. 
Next, consider two types of permit markets in which this industry might operate. In a 
restricted market, the industry has its own emissions target. In a broad-based market, it 
participates in a larger cap-and-trade system with other industries, each of which has its own 
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lowers long-run average costs by tA/y per unit. See Boehringer et al. (2002). 
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allocation mechanism. An important point is that the subsidy is a function of not the industry 
average emissions rate but the average allocation. In a restricted market, the average emissions 
rate will equilibrate to equal the average allocation; in a broad-based market, it need not. 
Restricted Permit Markets 
In restricted permit markets, all the firms participating in a given permit market compete 
in a single allocation pool. These firms remain price takers both in product and in permit 
markets. Total emissions for the restricted market are fixed at the Pigovian level of overall 
emissions (i.e., for sector i, 
**
ii E µ = i y  where 
*
i µ  and   satisfy (2) and (3) with  ). 
Permits totaling 
*
i y tM B =
i E  are allocated among program participants in each sector according to output 
shares. The rebate to individual firms in sector i thus equals  / ii aE y = i
R
i
 per unit of output. 
Let us denote this equilibrium with superscript R. In this case, the average permit 
allocation equals average emissions in each self-contained permit program, and 
R
i a µ = . Given 
that  , because of the presence of the output subsidy, to achieve the required emissions 
level, average emissions rates will have to be lower: 
* R
i yy > i
i
* R
i µ µ > . As a result, permit prices will be 
higher, reflecting the higher marginal cost of control: 
* () ()
RR
ii tc c i µ µ ′′ =− >− . 
Figure 1 depicts the excess burden of output-allocated permits compared with the social 
optimum in this partial equilibrium setting. The dead-weight loss occurs in two parts: (a) higher-
than-optimal production costs and (b) the damages implied by emissions from the excess 
production, less the corresponding consumer surplus. In other words, even though total 
emissions levels are optimal, marginal damages from output still exceed the marginal benefits. 
It is worth noting that applying separate cap-and-trade programs with output-based 
allocations to multiple sectors is equivalent to setting performance standards. When the sectoral 
allocation is based on Pigovian emissions, as in the case presented here, then marginal abatement 
costs will diverge according to the elasticity of demand for each sector’s output. Alternatively, 
one could set the performance standards such that marginal abatement costs would be equalized; 
to replicate this method with OBA requires allocating more permits (compared with the Pigovian 
levels) to sectors with relatively more elastic demand. Dissou (2003) simulates this method, 
using a CGE model to assess the effects of performance standards, set for each sector to both 
equalize marginal abatement costs and achieve an overall emissions target. A similar method was 
used by Goulder et al. (1997). Effectively, this represents OBA with a different rule for 
allocating permits at the sectoral level. 
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Figure 1: Partial Equilibrium Efficiency Loss from OBA 
 
Consequently, modeling performance standards to equalize marginal abatement costs 
does not represent OBA more generally, since the rule for determining the overall sector’s 
allocation can vary, and it is important. Furthermore, with multiple sectors, it is a far more 
complicated policy problem to set performance standards so as to equalize marginal abatement 
costs, whereas markets achieve that with a multisector trading program with OBA. 
Multisector Permit Markets 
Of course, many pollutants—including greenhouse gases—are emitted from a variety of 
activities and rarely just a single sector. In this case, allowing permit trading across sectors in a 
broad-based market can allow for a more efficient allocation of effort. However, output-based 
allocation of permits can also affect the distribution of effort. 
By the same logic as the restricted market model, equilibrium permit prices in the broad 
market must be higher than optimal, since the output subsidies limit conservation incentives, 
requiring more emissions rate reduction and higher marginal costs of emissions control. If the 
sectors are not identical—that is, if they display different cost structures, emissions, or demand 
elasticities—then the implicit subsidies and their effects will vary. In restricted markets with 
OBA, sectors with greater demand elasticities will compensate by driving up marginal abatement 
costs more. 
In other words, suppose each sector’s targets under restricted permit markets were set so 
that marginal abatement costs would be equalized with lump-sum allocation; those costs diverge 
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with OBA. With trade, marginal abatement costs are again equalized across sectors; the sectors 
with relatively inelastic demand will tend to increase their overcompliance and sell permits to 
those whose consumers would otherwise more easily conserve or find substitutes. Furthermore, 
as costs and thereby output change with multisector trade, the average allocation will not 
necessarily reflect average emissions in each sector. 
To understand the intuition behind these results, consider this simple but extreme 
example. Two sectors compete in a single permit market, each with output-based allocation of 
permits within the sector, but one sector has perfectly inelastic demand. Let Sector 1 be that 
sector; its total allocation equals 
**
11 A 1 y µ = , and since the equilibrium output level does not 
change, its average allocation always equals 
*
1 a 1 µ = . In an equilibrium with multisector 
emissions trading (denoted with superscript M), Sector 1 then has an output price of 
*
11 1 () (
MM M M pc t 1 ) µ µµ =+− . Meanwhile, Sector 2 faces more elastic demand. It receives a total 
allocation of 
**
22 A 2 y µ = , which will correspond to an average allocation of 
**
22 2 / 2




price in that sector then equals 
**
22 2 2 2 () ( /
MM M M p ct y y µµ µ =+− . In a permit market 
equilibrium, we know that total emissions across sectors must equal the total cap: 
. Furthermore, the marginal costs of reducing emissions rates per unit of 
output must be equalized at the permit price: 
*
11 22 1 2
MM M yy A µµ += + A
12 () ()
MM cc µ µ ′′ −= −. 
Suppose the emissions price were equal to the optimal marginal abatement cost; whereas 
Sector 1 always supplies the optimal quantity, in Sector 2, with the output allocation subsidy, a 
greater quantity will be demanded. The emissions embodied in the extra output would violate the 
cap, so permit prices must rise and emissions rates fall in both industries to maintain the cap. 
Overall, Sector 1 will emit less than the socially optimal amount, and Sector 2 will emit more. 
Alternatively, we can compare this equilibrium to that of restricted permit markets with 
OBA. With separate permit markets, consumers in the sector with inelastic demand reap the full 
benefit of the output subsidy, but efficiency is not affected. In Sector 2, efficiency losses are 
present, since the emissions rate and consumer price are lower than optimal. When these sectors 
are allowed to trade permits, the permit price would then equilibrate in between, with Sector 1 
lowering emissions rates (being more than compensated by the subsidy transfer) and Sector 2 
raising them (but still not as high as optimal emissions intensities), so that 
*
11 2 2 ,
MR M *
2 µ µµ µ µ << < . For Sector 2, lower permit prices and lower control costs mean that 
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consumer prices are even lower than in the restricted permit market case, even though the value 
of the allocation subsidy falls as well.6 Consumer prices in Sector 1 must also be lower; 
according to the first-order condition for profit maximization, if a firm wants to decrease its 
emissions rate and trade, its overall costs must be lower. 
Taken from another view, output-based allocations can create false gains from trade, 
based on the extent to which abatement choices are distorted by the output subsidy. Sectors with 
relatively inelastic demand functions realize a comparative advantage in abatement arising, in a 
sense, from their greater ability to pass costs along to consumers. 
The net effects of permit trading on welfare depend on whether the efficiency loss 
decreases as it is redistributed. Overcompliance in Sector 1 represents a real resource cost, but it 
allows Sector 2 to reduce its overcompliance. However, its output price then reflects even less of 
the cost of the embodied emissions. As the costs of reducing emissions rates are presumably 
convex, cost savings will arise from spreading overcompliance across the sectors. Thus, the 
question in the partial equilibrium problem is whether those savings outweigh the additional 
efficiency loss from more overproduction in Sector 2. 
In a general equilibrium framework, however, this output effect may be less costly 
because of interactions with tax distortions and uncovered sectors. To explore these trade-offs, 
we next apply this sectoral model of emissions regulation with output-based allocation to a 
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and the case of reducing CO2. 
General Equilibrium Model with Trade and Taxation 
Description 
Since we are primarily concerned with the distributional and efficiency effects of 
emissions permit allocation mechanisms with taxes and trade, we employ a CGE model from the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), which offers richness in calculating trade impacts. In 
particular, we can look in detail at the effects on a more diverse and disaggregated set of energy-
                                                 
6 See Fischer (2003).  
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using sectors than in most climate models.7 However, this static model is not designed 
specifically to study climate policy. It lacks the capability to examine certain issues of import, 
particularly dynamic responses, since it does not project energy use into the future or allow for 
technological change. As such, our results should be considered illustrative of the near-term 
effects on different sectors of implementing a climate policy using different allocation 
mechanisms for emissions permits. Our impacts of interest include CO2 emissions, production, 
trade, and employment by sector, as well as overall welfare, both in the United States and 
abroad, and carbon leakage. 
The model and simulations in this paper are based on version 5 of the GTAPinGAMS 
package developed by Thomas Rutherford and documented for version 4 of the dataset and 
model in Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). The GTAP-EG model serves as the platform for the 
model outlined here. The GTAP-EG dataset is a GAMS dataset merging version 5 of the GTAP 
economic data with information on energy flows. A more complete discussion of the energy data 
used can be found in Complainville and van der Mensbrugghe (1998). 
Three features are added to the GTAP-EG structure allow us to model the impact of the 
policy scenarios. First, we add a carbon price. Second, the appropriate structure for simulating an 
output-based allocation scheme must be incorporated into the model. Third, the household is 
given a labor/leisure choice so that labor taxes are distorting. This distortionary tax allows us to 
conduct simulations recycling revenue from pollution permits to offset the distorting tax 
instrument. 
Incorporating Output-Based Allocation 
Several changes need to be made to the GTAP-EG code to incorporate output-based 
allocation of pollution permits. The profit function is not directly accessible in the MPSGE 
framework. Instead, we incorporate output-based permit allocation through the production 
function as a sector-based subsidy, combining it with side constraints on the values of a to 
duplicate the effect on the profit function above. Additionally, we create an additional composite 
                                                 
7 We report impacts on 18 nonenergy sectors and 5 energy sectors. Most of the major climate models are much more 
highly aggregated, with five or fewer nonenergy sectors (Fischer and Morgenstern 2003). Some have more detail in 
modeling specific energy supplies. However, climate models based on GTAP, such as recent versions of ABARE-
GTEM, can offer richness in all of these dimensions. 
11 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Fox 
fossil fuel nest to production. This allows us to incorporate the pollution permit as a Leontief 
technology, allowing us to track pollution permits through the model. 
In the original GTAP-EG model, the treatment of energy goods does not allow for 
tracking of permits by sector. To track pollution permits, we must ensure that one permit is 
demanded for each unit of carbon that enters into production. It is accomplished by separating 
the energy goods into a separate activity, a Leontief technology combining the polluting inputs 
with permits, creating a new composite good (labeled ffi in the code, for fossil fuel input). The 
composite of permit and energy input is then included in the production block for the output 
good (y), ensuring that the implicit cost of embodied emissions is reflected in the output price. 
The next step is to incorporate the endogenous subsidy implied by the output-based 
allocation of permits within a sector. We mimic this in the form of an endogenous tax rate, z, into 











=− , , where  is the sector-level allocation for 
sector i of country r. 
, ir A
We consider two potential rules for determining this sector-level allocation. The 
historical emissions rule defines the sector’s apportionment of pollution permits as the baseline 
unit demand for carbon multiplied by the percentage cap ( r κ ) on emissions: 
. The variable  ,, ,
Hist
ir r f eir f eir
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A κχ φ = ∑ , , r i fe , , χ  is the carbon coefficient for final energy 
good  in sector i of country r. The variable  } , , { gas oil coal fe∈ r i fe , , φ  represents the demand of the 
fossil fuel input. The value-added rule apportions the same number of permits based on each of 













The allocation mechanism is active only within those industries or sectors that demand 
carbon-containing fuel as an intermediate input. Within the GTAP-EG model, the following 
sectors are excluded: coal, petroleum and coal products, crude oil, natural gas, mining, and 
dwellings. Final demand for energy products is also subject to emissions permitting. The permits 
for these activities are freely traded in the same marketplace as those initially allocated on the 
basis of output. We have a system in which all pollution is subject to permitting and all permits 
are tradable within the country. The difference lies in how permits are distributed in the baseline 
and how revenues are recycled. 
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Incorporating Labor/Leisure Choice 
The GTAP-EG model has also been extended by incorporating a labor/leisure choice into 
the household’s decision. The procedure is documented in Fox (2002). Incorporating a 
labor/leisure choice allows us to treat the labor tax as a distorting tax, hence creating a distorting 
policy instrument to offset with auction permit revenues. Since we have no data on labor taxes 
within the GTAP-EG database, we assume a labor tax rate of 40% within Annex B countries and 
a 20% tax rate within all other countries.8
Policy Experiments 
The Climate Stewardship Act proposes to cap emissions in 2010–2016 to 2000 levels, 
eliminating a decade of increase.9 In this spirit, we set the basic policy goal to be a similar 14% 
reduction of CO2 emissions from the base-year level (1997 in our case).10 The Climate 
Stewardship Act also provides for sector-level apportionment to covered emissions sources,11 
with broad consideration given to historical emissions as well as shares to CCCC. Details—
including the actual shares and the distribution methods within sectors to the firms—are left to 
future rulemakings by the Commerce Department secretary and the administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency. It is also unclear whether CCCC would use the revenues from 
permit sales to offer lump-sum rebates (dividends) to consumers, lower federal taxes, or 
otherwise target the funds. In other words, this overall framework—should it be enacted—seems 
to offer a wide range of possibilities for allocation; hence, it is important to understand the 
consequences of alternative mechanisms. 
To concentrate on the effects of U.S. program design, we refrain for now from modeling 
policy changes in other countries. Incorporating the carbon policies under development in other 
regions would have other general equilibrium effects; however, they are unlikely to change the 
relative impacts of the U.S. policy scenarios. 
                                                 
8 Tax data are an area targeted for improvement in GTAP (Babiker et al. 2001). 
9 After that period, emissions are to be further reduced to 1990 levels, though not below, as specified in the Kyoto 
Protocol targets. 
10 The latest version of GTAP is 2001,and we are attempting to update the numbers. 
11 These are electric generation, industrial production, commercial activities, and transportation. 
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We conduct five experiments to assess the relative impact of using an output-based 
allocation scheme compared with other permit allocation methods. We face two basic issues 
here: (a) how to allocate pollution permits and (b) how permit revenues enter into the 
government budget, to the extent the permits are auctioned. The experiments are as follows. 
Grandfather + Lump: Permits are grandfathered to all (including final demand),12 and 
the government budget is held constant through a lump-sum tax. It is the equivalent of taking 
back a portion of the lump-sum-rebated permit revenue. (Hence, it is also equivalent to Auction 
+ Lump). 
Grandfather + Ltax: Permits are grandfathered to all (including final demand), and the 
government budget is held constant through a labor tax. This is the equivalent of a lump-sum 
rebate of all permit revenues. 
Auction + Ltax: Permits are sold—no grandfathering—and permit revenues are used to 
offset the labor tax. 
Historical OBA + Ltax: Permits are allocated to firms based on output shares in sectors 
with intermediate energy demand, sector shares are based on historical emissions, and 
government revenue is held constant through a labor tax. Those permits not distributed (i.e., 
those for final demand) flow back into the government budget. 
Historical OBA + Lump: Permits are allocated to firms based on output shares in 
sectors with intermediate energy demand, sector shares are based on historical emissions, and 
government revenue is held constant through a lump-sum tax. Those permits not distributed (i.e., 
those for final demand) flow back into the government budget. 
Value-Added OBA + Ltax: Permits are allocated to firms based on output shares in 
sectors with intermediate energy demand, sector shares are based on historical shares of value 
added, and government revenue is held constant through a labor tax. Those permits not 
grandfathered (i.e., those for final demand) flow back into the government budget. 
                                                 
12 This represents a departure from the Climate Stewardship Act, which excludes consumers and agriculture. 
However, we found that grandfathering permits to firms only (intermediate demand) made little difference on the 
major outcomes.  
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Results 
Permit Allocation 
For the gratis distribution scenarios, permit allocation occurs in two phases. First, the rule 
for sector allocations is chosen; we consider historical emissions shares and value-added shares 
as examples. In both cases, permits are allocated to sectors with primary energy demand (which 
tends to exclude primary energy producers).13 Second, those sector allocations are either 
grandfathered in lump-sum fashion among firms within each sector or made based on output. 
The sector allocations for these scenarios are reported in Table 1. Permits representing 
final demand (residential energy use, representing a little less than 7%) are assumed to be held 
by the government and auctioned. 
Table 1: Sector Shares of Carbon Cap with Historical and Value-Added Rules 
Sector Historical  Value-
Added 
Agriculture 0.9%  1.3% 
Electricity 41.0%  1.4% 
Iron and steel industry  1.1%  0.5% 
Chemical industry   9.6%  2.9% 
Nonferrous metals   0.3%  0.3% 
Nonmetallic minerals   1.1%  0.6% 
Transport equipment  0.2%  1.9% 
Paper, pulp, print  0.9%  1.8% 
Trade and transportation  27.9%  2.6% 
Air transport  4.4%  0.7% 
Other machinery  0.5%  6.7% 
Food products   0.9%  2.2% 
Wood and wood products  0.2%  0.9% 
Construction 0.0%  5.9% 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 0.2%  0.9% 
Other manufacturing  0.2%  0.7% 
Commercial and public services  4.0%  62.1% 
Total 93.4%  93.4% 
Unsurprisingly, the distribution of emissions is quite different from that of the overall 
economy. The electricity sector accounts for just over two-fifths of national emissions, followed 
                                                 
13 This assumption runs somewhat counter to the Climate Stewardship Act, which allocates many of the transport 
sector permits to the upstream energy suppliers. 
15 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Fox 
by trade and transport with another quarter, and the chemical industry with nearly a tenth. On the 
other hand, services represent two-thirds of value added; all other sectors have modest shares—
less than 10%. 
Summary Economic Indicators for the United States 
Overall, the 14% reduction induces less than a 1% change in the summary economic 
indicators for all the scenarios, reported in Table 2. However, the relative effects of the allocation 
scenarios are illustrative. 
As predicted, auctioning permits with revenue recycling produces the smallest welfare 
loss for the United States, measured in equivalent variation. In fact, this mechanism seems to 
lead to an increase in the real wage and employment, due to the fall in the labor tax. 
Table 2: Percentage Change in Summary Indicators 













Welfare (equivalent variation)   –0.06 –0.07 –0.02 –0.05 –0.05 –0.03 
Production  –0.41 –0.44 –0.30 –0.29 –0.29 –0.33 
Employment  –0.10  –0.15 0.09 0.00  –0.01 0.02 
Real  wage  –0.40 –0.59  0.35 –0.04 –0.06  0.04 
Labor tax change (percentage 
points)    0.32 –1.28 –0.05   –0.11 
Permit price ($/metric ton C)  $ 29.93  $ 29.87  $ 30.18  $ 40.85  $ 40.84  $ 30.59 
Grandfathering permits with the labor tax adjustment entails the largest welfare cost—
and the largest drop in the real wage—since the loss of tax revenues from the economic 
contraction requires an increase in the labor tax rate. For this reason, grandfathering permits with 
a lump-sum tax adjustment fares better. 
The most notable effect of historical OBA is the dramatic rise in the price of permits, 
which are a third more costly than all of the other scenarios. The revenue adjustments were 
minor—even slightly negative, because of the greater value of the permits withheld for auction—
so there was little difference between the lump-sum and labor tax adjustments. The impacts on 
overall welfare are similar to those with grandfathering and lump-sum adjustment; however, the 
impacts on production and on the real wage were much smaller. In other words, the mitigation of 
the consumer price increases, easing the burden of tax and trade distortions, roughly offset the 
inefficiencies in allocating emissions reductions (which we discuss subsequently in detail). 
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Value-added OBA functions a good deal like a consumption tax reduction and therefore 
approaches auctioning in efficiency (though not perfectly so, since not all sectors generating 
value added receive allocations). Overall, the welfare cost was only slightly higher than 
auctioning. This scenario brought about a slight increase in the real wage, due not only to a small 
drop in the tax rate but also to a more even distribution of the effective output subsidies 
throughout the economy. 
Although the changes in the summary indicators are relatively small, the impacts are 
more significant when broken down by sector. In these cases, the sector-level differences 
between the lump-sum and labor-tax revenue adjustments are so minor that we report only the 
scenarios with revenue recycling. 
Carbon Emissions 
Nearly all the scenarios had the same impact on the distribution of carbon emissions 
reductions—with the dramatic exception of historical OBA. In this scenario, emissions 
reductions shift away from heavy historical polluters (sectors like electricity and other 
manufacturing) toward other sectors, including agriculture, iron and steel, and services. 
Table 3: Percentage Change in Emissions 




OBA Hist + 
Ltax 
OBA VA + 
Ltax 
Agriculture –20.5  –20.6  –23.6  –20.6 
Electricity –13.0  –13.0  –11.6  –13.0 
Iron and steel industry  –13.1  –13.2  –15.1  –13.2 
Chemical industry   –6.2  –6.1  –5.4  –6.1 
Nonferrous metals   –4.7  –4.7  –3.1  –4.6 
Nonmetallic minerals   –10.9  –10.9  –11.8  –10.9 
Transport equipment  –4.9  –4.9  –4.1  –4.8 
Paper, pulp, print  –7.3  –7.3  –7.2  –7.2 
Trade and transportation  –19.4  –19.5  –19.9  –19.5 
Air transport  –6.4  –6.3  –4.8  –6.2 
Other machinery  –4.8  –4.8  –4.4  –4.7 
Food products   –12.3  –12.3  –12.4  –12.2 
Wood and wood products  –4.9  –4.9  –4.2  –4.8 
Construction –4.8  –4.9  –6.0  –4.7 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather  –6.7  –6.6  –6.5  –6.5 
Other manufacturing  –4.7  –4.6  –2.4  –4.4 
Commercial and public services –15.6  –15.7 –19.2 –15.8 
Total –13.9  –13.9  –13.4  –13.9 
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Output 
Corresponding to the emissions impacts, production in historically polluting sectors is 
significantly higher with historical OBA, with less than half the contraction in output in 
electricity, chemicals, transport, mining, and minerals. With this shift from output substitution as 
a means for emissions reductions in the major polluting sectors, the carbon price rises by a third 
to induce reductions elsewhere. This price rise has the added effect of raising the value of the 
permit allocations, reinforcing the subsidies. 
For example, although agriculture engages in greater emissions reductions with historical 
OBA, the sector’s output is less affected; although it receives fewer permits, the total value is 
nearly the same. Harder hit are wood products and textiles, which benefit little from the subsidy 
and are harmed by the higher permit prices and trade exposure. 
Table 4: Percentage Change in Output 






OBA VA + 
Ltax 
Agriculture  –0.34 –0.24 –0.09 –0.22 
Coal  –8.98 –8.96 –8.68 –9.03 
Petroleum and coal products (refined)  –4.49  –4.38  –3.96  –4.36 
Crude  oil  –1.87 –1.79 –1.86 –1.84 
Natural  gas  –4.81 –4.75 –4.70 –4.80 
Electricity  –4.85 –4.76 –1.14 –4.69 
Iron and steel industry  –0.54  –0.40  –0.41  –0.44 
Chemical industry   –1.70  –1.60  –0.47  –1.62 
Nonferrous metals   –0.99  –0.86  –0.46  –0.91 
Nonmetallic  minerals    –0.97 –0.89 –0.33 –0.92 
Transport equipment  0.13  0.27  –0.19  0.25 
Paper,  pulp,  print  –0.31 –0.16 –0.21 –0.17 
Trade and transportation  –4.54  –4.43  –0.70  –4.48 
Air  transport  –3.21 –3.03 –0.67 –3.12 
Other machinery  0.45  0.58  –0.33  0.57 
Mining    –1.09 –1.01 –0.47 –1.24 
Food  products    –0.23 –0.07 –0.10 –0.07 
Wood and wood products  –0.07  0.02  –0.21  0.01 
Construction  –0.16 –0.13 –0.11 –0.15 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather  –0.22  0.01  –0.26  –0.02 
Other  manufacturing  –1.06 –0.87 –0.12 –0.91 
Commercial and public services  –0.06  0.12  –0.13  0.09 
Dwellings 0.24  0.33  –0.13  –0.03 
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Price Effects 
For the sectors that use energy and electricity as inputs, their price effects tend to be 
mirror opposites of the output effects. However, the prices of these energy inputs can help 
explain some of these output effects. 
Table 5 reports the changes in prices received by energy producers. Primary energy 
prices to producers are exclusive of permits, but consumer (or intermediate producer) costs are 
inclusive of permit costs.14 The most notable difference for primary energy producer prices is 
that the price of refined products falls more significantly with historical OBA, which implies a 
larger carbon price wedge. Including carbon costs implies significant price rises for energy 
purchasers, particularly with historical OBA. 
Table 5: Percentage Change in Energy Prices 
Sector  GF Hist + Ltax  Auction All + 
Ltax 
OBA Hist + 
Ltax 
OBA VA +  
Ltax 
  Permit  Cost  Excl. Incl. Excl. Incl. Excl. Incl. Excl. Incl. 
Coal –7.54 39.79 –7.66 40.21 –7.53 57.48  –7.50 40.98
Petroleum and coal products 
(refined)  –0.65 9.70 –0.72 9.74 –1.03 13.13 –0.66 9.93
Natural gas  –4.66 10.51 –4.75 10.60 –4.80 16.13  –4.62 10.93
Crude  oil  –1.74 –1.79 –1.88 –1.75 
Electricity 7.05  7.08  –0.45  7.17 
The electricity price is inclusive of carbon costs as well as any allocation subsidy. In all 
but the historical OBA, the consumer price rises significantly—a signal for other sectors to 
conserve. With historical OBA, the price actually falls, meaning that electricity is cheaper than 
without the carbon policy. This result helps explain why, despite the higher permit price, the 
producer price of coal does not fall more than with other scenarios, since the electricity sector 
provides most of the demand for coal. It also explains why more price pressure is placed on other 
primary energy sources, since more reductions must then come from those sources. 
                                                 
14 Crude oil does not embody permit costs; those requirements are revealed in the refined oil prices. 
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Trade 
Since historical OBA causes the greatest distortion in relative prices, it has the greatest 
impact on trade. Table 6 presents the change in net exports, evaluated at the base year prices, in 
millions of dollars. The net export position of the heavy emitters falls much less dramatically 
(and even rises for electricity). However, some sectors that are relatively more competitive in 
other allocation regimes see their net exports fall with historical OBA: food and wood products, 
transport equipment, construction, textiles, and commercial and public services. These sectors 
face high permit prices and labor costs and few subsidies. 
Net exports of primary energy products increase in all scenarios, since domestic demand 
declines. Overall, net exports fall most with historical OBA and least with auctioning. These 
general equilibrium trade effects lead to some degree of leakage of carbon-intensive production 
to other countries. 
Table 6: Change in Net Exports 






OBA VA + 
Ltax 
Agriculture –203  –299  –11  –243 
Coal 1,677  1,687  1,558  1,651 
Petroleum and coal products (refined)  649  636  573  592 
Crude oil  4,078  3,996  3,474  3,945 
Natural gas  1,091  1,091  1,027  1,068 
Electricity –629  –644  18  –655 
Iron and steel industry  –681  –680  –44  –700 
Chemical industry   –5,425  –5,604  –1,276  –5,589 
Nonferrous metals   –769  –776  –98  –794 
Nonmetallic minerals   –611  –616  –113  –629 
Transport equipment  1,351  1,481  –691  1,471 
Paper, pulp, print  –65  –84  –218  –62 
Trade and transportation  –10,466  –10,551  –713  –10,634 
Air transport  –2,754  –2,742  –588  –2,801 
Other machinery  5,940  6,300  –1,924  6,374 
Mining   –82  –83  –28  –139 
Food products   295  194  –304  271 
Wood and wood products  158  159  –171  175 
Construction 115  128  –32  127 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather  368  294  –291  318 
Other manufacturing  –432  –467  –60  –469 
Commercial and public services  5,924 6,144  –1,313 6,283 
Total –467  –437  –1,224  –439 
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Carbon Leakage 
Carbon leakage is driven primarily by the relative price effects for energy-intensive 
sectors. Since historical OBA is the only scenario to target those sectors specifically, it proves 
the most effective at limiting the increase in emissions among trading partners. Value-added 
OBA offers a slight improvement compared with grandfathering and auction. Thus, OBA has the 
potential to reduce carbon leakage relative to other methods, but the rule for allocating at the 
sector level is important for determining this effect. 
Table 7 compares leakage in the most important industries, focusing on the two OBA 
scenarios, since the others are so similar to the value-added allocation. 
Table 7: Carbon Leakage in the Largest Emitting Sectors 















Electricity 603,573 –69,825 7,279 10% –78,327  8,400  11%
Trade and transportation  410,489 –81,883 2,645 3% –80,230  8,340  10%
Chemical industry   141,209 –7,692 1,793 23% –8,549  2,993  35%
Air transport  64,697 –3,117 496 16% –4,043  1,407  35%
Comm. and pub. services 58,605 –11,244 443 4% –9,240  359  4%
Iron and steel industry  16,351 –2,476 797 32% –2,157  757  35%
Nonmetallic minerals   16,017 –1,886 603 32% –1,744 690  40%
Food products   13,894 –1,721 127 7% –1,697  113  7%
Paper/pulp/print 13,602 –980 150 15% –980  137  14%
Agriculture 13,271 –3,128 414 13% –2,728  355  13%
Other manufacturing  2,725 –64 1,020 1583% –121  1,078  889%
Total  1,376,219 –184,980 16,155 9% –190,896 24,910  13%
In the electricity sector, historical OBA reduces leakage compared to value-added OBA, 
but it also induces even fewer reductions. In the chemical sector, the reduction in leakage 
dominates this effect, resulting in more net reductions for that industry. Not only is leakage 
reduced in the trade and transportation sector with historical OBA, but domestic emissions 
reductions are also higher, despite higher output. This result arises due to the higher carbon price 
and greater input substitution possibilities in that sector, including a shift toward labor. We also 
note the rather important leakage in other manufacturing under all of the scenarios. The 
emissions intensity of this aggregated sector seems to be much higher abroad than in the United 
States, causing a small shift in output to have a relatively large impact on emissions for the 
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sector. This effect may explain why emissions leakage to manufacturing countries like China 
does not fall as much with historical OBA as does leakage to other trading partners, like Europe. 
Table 8 shows carbon leakage by trading partner for each of the allocation scenarios. 
Table 8: Carbon Leakage as Percentage of U.S. Reduction 




OBA Hist + 
Ltax 
OBA VA + 
Ltax 
Canada   1.37    1.38    0.94    1.37  
Europe   3.18    3.19    1.64    3.17  
Japan   0.61    0.61    0.43    0.61  
Other OECD   0.30    0.30    0.21    0.29  
Former Soviet Union   0.93    0.93    0.76    0.91  
Central European Associates   0.68    0.69    0.53    0.68  
China (including Hong Kong, Taiwan)   1.91    1.92    1.55    1.88  
India   0.25    0.25    0.20    0.25  
Brazil   0.19    0.19    0.14    0.19  
Other Asia   0.92    0.92    0.48    0.91  
Mexico + OPEC   1.03    1.03    0.61    1.02  
Rest of world   1.63    1.62    1.14    1.61  
Total   13.00    13.03    8.64    12.89  
International Impacts 
Although historical OBA eases some of the burden of tax and trade distortions compared 
with grandfathering for the United States, this set of output subsidies seems to have the strongest 
impact on the welfare of trading partners, Canada in particular. The reason is that reduction in 
U.S. consumer demand is not compensated by an improvement in competitiveness in the 
industries with historically large emissions. 
These international impacts of U.S. climate policy are presented in Table 9. By our 
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Table 9: Percentage Change in Welfare by Country (Equivalent Variation) 




OBA Hist + 
Ltax 
OBA VA + 
Ltax 
United  States  –0.07 –0.02 –0.05 –0.03 
Canada  –0.14 –0.13 –0.19 –0.13 
Europe  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Japan  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Other  OECD  –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 –0.05 
Former Soviet Union  –0.08  –0.08  –0.09  –0.08 
Central European Associates  –0.03  –0.02  0.04  –0.02 
China (including Hong Kong, Taiwan)  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 
India  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Brazil  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Other Asia  –0.01  –0.01  0.04  –0.01 
Mexico + OPEC  –0.18  –0.18  –0.21  –0.17 
Rest of world  –0.07  –0.06  –0.06  –0.06 
Conclusion 
The use of emissions trading represents an important step in improving the efficiency of 
environmental regulation. However, the tremendous implicit value of the capped emissions—
particularly in the case of carbon—raises important political and economic questions about how 
to allocate the permits. The practical reality seems that the vast majority of permits will be given 
away gratis to the regulated industries. If so, can we design the allocation process to mitigate the 
problems of welfare costs, tax distortions, and carbon leakage? 
The answer may be that these goals pose trade-offs. In terms of the overall economic 
indicators—welfare, production, employment, and real wages—auctioning with revenue 
recycling is the preferred allocation method. Value-added OBA, which effectively attempts to 
embed the proportional tax rebate into consumer prices, is a fairly close second by these metrics, 
improving notably over lump-sum grandfathering. 
However, in terms of mitigating carbon leakage, historical OBA is clearly the most 
effective. For the same reason—that it limits price rises in energy-intensive sectors—it also 
poses the greatest costs on other sectors. While this result would imply important efficiency 
losses in a partial equilibrium model, we find that these losses are offset by gains in terms of 
mitigating tax interactions in a general equilibrium framework, where historical OBA is no more 
costly in welfare terms than grandfathering. 
This raises the issue of whether the sector allocation rule can be optimized to target some 
set of these goals. For example, what might the optimal subsidies to limit leakage look like, and 
23 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Fox 
what impact might they have on overall welfare?15 What are the relative roles of carbon 
intensity, trade exposure, and demand elasticities in determining these subsidies? 
Finally, although theory offers some support that OBA can enhance the economic 
efficiency and environmental additionality of emissions trading in a second-best setting, the 
question remains whether OBA can pass legal muster under world trade rules.16 From an 
economic point of view, taxing the carbon content of imports from countries with lesser climate 
policies can similarly combat leakage; however, such an import tax is very likely to be 
challenged in the World Trade Organization. Since allocation is perceived as a component of 
environmental regulation, not a direct subsidy, OBA may enjoy legal leeway. On the other hand, 
since OBA can create a significant subsidy to industry, it has the potential for abuse in practice. 
Indeed, unlike with sector-specific performance standards or emissions trading systems, with 
broad-based, intersectoral trade, OBA can be designed to offer subsidies that outweigh the direct 
effect of the regulatory compliance costs. Resolving the question of whether OBA is a legal 
policy tool (and under what conditions) could have important implications for the efficiency—
and inefficiency—of future climate policies.17
                                                 
15 This question is a general equilibrium variation of that posed by Bovenberg and Goulder (2000), who calculated 
the gratis permit shares needed to hold industry profits harmless.  
16 For further discussion, see Fischer et al. (2003). 
17 The European Union has its own “state aid” rules, and the European Commission, in monitoring the national 
allocation plans, seems to be frowning on explicit updating schemes; however, most plans have aspects of gratis 
allocation that are not truly lump sum, being conditional on production, and expectations for the second commitment 
period allocations that create expectations similar to OBA incentives. In the United States, OBA is explicitly 
allowed—even encouraged—in the formulation of state allocation plans for NOx trading in the Northeast.  
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Appendix: MPSGE Code for Output-Based Allocation 
Fossil Fuel Production Activity (Crude, Gas, and Coal) 
$prod:y(xe,r)$vom(xe,r) s:(esub_es(xe,r)) id:0 
o:py(xe,r)q:vom(xe,r)a:gov(r) t:ty(xe,r) 
i:pa(j,r)q:vafm(j,xe,r)p:pai0(j,xe,r) a:gov(r) t:ti(j,xe,r) id: 
i:pl(r)q:(ld0(xe,r)/pl0(r)) p:pl0(r) a:gov(r) n:ltax(r) id: 
i:pr(xe,r)q:rd0(xe,r) 
Non–Fossil Fuel Production (Includes Electricity and Refining) 
$prod:y(i,r)$nr(i,r) s:0 vae(s):0.5 va(vae):1 
+ e(vae):0.1 nel(e):0.5 lqd(nel):2 
+ oil(lqd):0 col(nel):0 gas(lqd):0 
o:py(i,r)q:vom(i,r) a:gov(r) t:ty(i,r) a:ra(r) 
n:z(i,r)$(sum(fe,vafm(fe,i,r))) 
i:pl(r)q:(ld0(i,r)/pl0(r)) p:pl0(r) a:gov(r) n:ltax(r) va: 
i:rkr(r)$rskq:kd0(i,r) va: 
i:rkg$gkq:kd0(i,r) va: 
i:pa(j,r)$(not fe(j))q:vafm(j,i,r) p:pai0(j,i,r) e:$ele(j) a:gov(r) 
t:ti(j,i,r) 
i:pffi(fe,i,r)$vafm(fe,i,r)q:(vafm(fe,i,r)*pai0(fe,i,r)) fe.tl: 
Fossil Fuel Composite (Fuel Plus Permit) 
$prod:ffi(fe,i,r)$(nr(i,r) and vafm(fe,i,r))  s:0 
o:pffi(fe,i,r) q:(vafm(fe,i,r)*pai0(fe,i,r)) 
i:pcarb(r)#(fe)q:carbcoef(fe,i,r) p:1e-6 
i:pa(fe,r)q:vafm(fe,i,r)p:pai0(fe,i,r) a:gov(r) t:ti(fe,i,r) 
OBA-Related Side Constraints 
$constraint:z(i,r)$(nr(i,r)and sum(fe,vafm(fe,i,r))) 
z(i,r) * py(i,r) * y(i,r) * vom(i,r) =e= ( - ebar(i,r) * y(i,r)) * pcarb(r); 
$constraint:ebar(i,r)$(nr(i,r) and sum(fe,vafm(fe,i,r))) 
ebar(i,r) * y(i,r) =e= PctCap(r) * (OBA_Hst * alloc_hst(i,r) +   OBA_Va * 
alloc_VA(i,r)); 
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